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THE 1926 RAILWAY LABOR ACT AND THE MODERN
AMERICAN AIRLINE INDUSTRY: CHANGES AND




T HE RAILWAY LABOR Act ("the RLA")I has governed labor
in the airline industry since the industry's infancy, and is
tailored to unique aspects of the transportation system in the
United States. The RLA recognizes that the transportation in-
dustry is vital to commerce and that interruptions in the opera-
tions of the industry due to labor disputes can paralyze
American commerce until such disputes, which may be relatively
minor, are resolved.
The airline industry has dramatically changed since the RLA
was adopted. The industry has matured past infancy, under-
gone government deregulation, and faced modern competitive
pressures in changing economies. Through all of this, however,
the RIA has remained remarkably static while labor conditions
and the importance of labor in the industry has changed. Labor
is increasingly becoming a greater issue in airline operations as
competitive pressures require increased efficiency and cuts in
operating costs, and additionally, as bankruptcy becomes an in-
creasingly common fate for major carriers.
In light of the changes to the airline industry, a real issue ex-
ists as to whether the RLA still meets the transportation indus-
try's needs while adequately protecting the interests of
organized labor. The checks and balances between airline man-
agement and labor unions still aim to promote continuity and
stability in the airline industry, but disputes have increasingly
resulted in otherwise illegal job actions because remedies are
not readily available. Changes in the airline industry due to
1 45 U.S.C. § 151 (2004).
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mergers, bankruptcies and lay-offs effectively force workers to
restart their careers when they seek employment in a new com-
pany. Acquired workers are treated like junior employees, re-
gardless of experience, in a system where seniority is everything.
Although in many such cases an airline's metaphorical hands
are tied by its obligations to honor labor contracts it has signed
with its existing workforce, employees acquired by merger need
some form of protection of their interests, which the RLA does
not provide.
The airlines are increasingly seeking concessions from labor
to achieve profitability, often causing disruption and straining
relationships with their unions. This situation results from the
economic competitive pressures the airlines face post-deregula-
tion, especially in a down economy. However, secondary treat-
ment of a workforce acquired by merger or purchased through
bankruptcy liquidation should not be permitted. Toward this
end, the RLA should be amended to reinstate the administrative
Labor Protection Provisions, which have fallen by the wayside in
the last fifty years.
Furthermore, the increased use of partial or intermittent
strikes needs to be examined. Such tools are powerful leverage
for labor unions, and thanks to a 1993 district court ruling, Asso-
ciation of Flight Attendants v. Alaska Airlines,2 employers are lim-
ited in what they can do to combat such techniques. However,
no appellate court has addressed whether such techniques
should be afforded "protected" or "unprotected" status under
the RLA. This large, unsettled area of the law will likely become
increasingly pertinent as labor unions realize the power of this
weapon. The RLA ought to be modified now to deal with this
emerging problem and to level the playing field between airline
management and labor.
This comment will first examine the adoption of the RIA, fol-
lowed by an examination of the changes in the airline industry
that have revealed specific shortcomings in the RLA's statutory
scheme to govern labor relations. Finally, this comment will
suggest solutions to these shortcomings.
II. BACKGROUND: THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The Railway Labor Act is somewhat of a misnomer today as it
applies to many transportation industries. Initially and unsur-
2 847 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Wash. 1993).
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prisingly, the RLA applied solely to the railroad industry.3 Sub-
sequent additions to the Act, however, have made it applicable
to the airline industry as well.4
A. HISTORY OF THE RLA - ADOPTION AND INTENT
The RLA originated as an agreement between railroad carri-
ers and labor unions as a way to peaceably settle labor disputes
in the absence of anti-strike legislation.5 Congress enacted the
RLA in 1926, formally codifying this industry agreement, in rec-
ognition of the importance of the smooth operation of the
transportation industry.6 Through the RLA, Congress imposes a
duty on both employers and organized workers to maintain a
relationship, even during disputes, thereby providing stability in
the transportation industry and interstate commerce, to the ex-
tent that it is affected by the transportation industry.7 The RLA
provides a procedural framework for collective bargaining and
dispute resolution that is designed to minimize the potential for
disputes that unnecessarily impede national transportation and
commerce.
The airline industry was not subject to labor legislation until
1936 when a pilots' union petitioned Congress for labor protec-
tion.8 At that time, two labor protection schemes existed that
could have applied to the pilots' union: the RLA or the more
3 See 45 U.S.C. § 151.
4 See id. § 181.
5 Maureen F. Moore, Hit and Run Strikes-Protected Activity or Suicidal Actions
Under the Railway Labor Act?, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 867, 869 (1994) ("After many
frustrating attempts to pass a law to prevent strikes more effectively in the [rail-
road] industry, the representatives of labor and management met and drafted
legislation to which they could both agree.").
6 "'The purpose of this act is to ratify and put the stamp of approval of Con-
gress on the agreement entered into between the railroads and their workers to
insure peace in this great industry and uninterrupted operation of the railroads.
It simply provides for kindly, friendly cooperation between the railroads and the
railroad workers."' Joshua Akbar, Comment, CHAOS in the Airline Industry: Pick-
ing Up Where Association of Flight Attendants v. Alaska Airlines Left Off 4 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 571, 575 (2002) (quoting 67 CONG. REc. 4,702 (1926) (statement
of Congressman Robsion of Kentucky)).
7 See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (imposing a duty on carriers and employees to "exert
every reasonable effort" to "avoid any interruption to commerce or to the opera-
tion of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the em-
ployees thereof").
8 Thomas E. Reinert, Jr., Airline Labor Disruptions: Is the RLA Still Adequate?, 15
AIR & SPACE LAw. 4 (2001).
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recently enacted National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").9 The
NLRA focused more on workers' rights to unionize, not how a
union interacts with an employer or the relationship between a
company and its employees. The RLA, in contrast, prescribed
procedures for employer-union dealings to promote stability,
while offering workers some measure of protection. At the time
of its adoption, commercial air travel was not significant enough
to greatly impact interstate commerce and, therefore, preserv-
ing labor-management relations and providing ongoing industry
stability were not pressing concerns. Despite the airline indus-
try's small size relative to the railroad industry, its commonalities
with other transportation industries covered by the RLA war-
ranted application of the RILA to airline employer-labor interac-
tions. As time passed, this proved to be a sage decision, as the
need for industry stability increased with industry growth.
B. A PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
With its primary aim of "avoid[ing] any interruption to com-
merce or to the operation of any carrier,"'" the RLA sets forth a
comprehensive scheme to govern negotiations and disputes be-
tween air carriers and their labor unions. The procedures are
divided into two categories: those for "major" disputes and those
for "minor" disputes." Both sets of procedures aim to preserve
the relationship between air carriers and their employees.
The RLA also governs the collective bargaining process, from
certification of a union to represent a specific "class or craft," to
preventing an employer from interfering with its employees'
right to unionize.' 2 While unions that are negotiating an initial
collective bargaining agreement receive little protection, 3 status
9 Id. § 151. The NLRA, as enacted in 1935, is also referred to as the Wagner
Act, and bears many differences from the current NLRA, which encompasses
changes made by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Act of
1959. Akbar, supra note 6, 574 n.20.
10 45 U.S.C. § 152.
11 The terms "major" and "minor" disputes are not contained within the stat-
ute. Rather, they were first articulated by the Supreme Court in Elgin, J & E. Ry.
v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 721 (1945), but are widely used in analysis of disputes
arising between parties governed by the RLA.
12 See 45 U.S.C. § 152.
13 See Mark A. Schuler, Note, The Railway Labor Act of 1926 and Modern-Day Air-
line Labor Strife: Progress Toward Labor Peace Begins With Overruling Williams v. Jack-
sonville Terminal Co., 21 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 189, 190 (1997) (discussing how
Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386 (1942) improperly denied RLA
protections to initial collective bargaining agreement negotiations and how "the
imbalance in RLA status quo application can only lead to more labor strife").
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quo provisions of the RLA prohibit unilateral changes to an
agreement upon termination of the agreement or otherwise
without going through proper dispute resolution channels,
thereby ensuring minimal disruption to airline operations while
an air carrier negotiates an agreement with a labor union.14
Perhaps the most important provision of the RLA mandates that
any collective bargaining agreement entered into by a recog-
nized union 15 never expires.1 6 The initial collective bargaining
agreement is subject to renegotiation of terms but will never re-
quire replacement.17 This mandate of permanency eliminates
the possibility of upset during negotiation of subsequent collec-
tive bargaining agreements.
Issues arise, however, regarding interpretation and applica-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement and regarding
changes in the collective bargaining agreement which either an
employer or a union wishes to make. Negotiations and disputes
relating to an existing collective bargaining agreement require
procedures to maintain operations, or the "status quo," until an
agreement or resolution is reached. The RLA attempts to main-
tain the status quo during these periods, while still offering pro-
tection to both employers and employees. Accordingly, either
party can invoke the protections of the RLA to maintain the sta-
tus quo.18 The protections applicable to a specific situation,
however, depend on whether the dispute is considered major or
minor.
14 See Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142,
156 (1969) (providing that the purpose of RLA Section 2 is to require that collec-
tive bargaining agreements between carriers and unions be changed only by the
statutory procedures provided in the RLA).
15 To be a "recognized union" as the term is here used, the National Mediation
Board must have certified the union elected by a recognized class of employees.
Under the RLA, employees are classified based solely on their trade; therefore,
the employee classes may be flight attendants, pilots, mechanics, or another
group of tradesmen, but will never be a combination of occupations. See 45
U.S.C. § 152.
16 Mark A. Schuler, Note, The Railway Labor Act of 1926 and Modern-Day Airline
Labor Strife: Progress Toward Labor Peace Begins With Overruling Williams v. Jackson-
ville Terminal Co., 21 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 189, 193 (1997) (citing Seaboard World
Airlines v. Transp. Workers Union, 443 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1971)); contra Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc., 469 F.2d 990,
992-93 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1974) (concluding that the RIA
does not extend a collective bargaining agreement beyond an agreed termina-
tion date specified by the parties).
17 Schuler, supra note 13, at 193 (citing Seaboard World Airlines, 443 F.2d at
437).
18 See 45 U.S.C. § 156.
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Regardless of whether a dispute is major or minor, all parties
to an RLA-governed dispute have a duty to first attempt, in good
faith, to settle their dispute before invoking the rights and pro-
cedural protections of the RLA.19 This duty is consistent with
the RLA's relationship approach to dispute resolution, as the
statute aims to preserve the relationship between an air carrier
and its employees despite disagreements.
1. "Minor" Disputes
Employees cannot legally resort to self-help measures in "mi-
nor" disputes, which require submission to the National Air
Transport Adjustment Board for arbitration.2 0 Employees may
strike, after following the RLA's resolution-attempt procedures,
in "major" disputes only. Under the RLA, minor disputes are
those between transportation carriers and employee unions that
arise from the interpretation or application of a particular provi-
sion of a collective bargaining agreement between the parties.21
Substantial litigation has arisen over what constitutes a minor
dispute. The prevailing test comes from the Supreme Court's
decision in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n.22 In Consolidated Rail, the Court held that an employer's
action gives rise to a minor dispute "if the action is arguably
justified by the terms of the parties' collective-bargaining agree-
ment. '2' The Court went on to state that a dispute is not minor,
but rather major, where "the employer's claims are frivolous or
obviously insubstantial. '24 The application of this test can vary
slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 25
The RLA establishes the National Air Transport Adjustment
Board ("NATAB") to exclusively arbitrate minor disputes. 26 The
19 See Matos v. Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A., 548 F. Supp. 933, 938-39 (E.D.N.Y.
1982).
20 45 U.S.C. § 185.
21 Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945).
22 491 U.S. 299 (1989).
23 Id. at 307.
24 Id.
25 Some jurisdictions have applied the "arguably justified" standard while
others have applied "obviously insubstantial," "spurious," "frivolous," or "not ar-
guably justified" standards. See William R. Wilder, et al., Judicial Enforcement of the
Railway Labor Act, in AIRLINE AND RAILROAD LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw: A COM-
PREHENSIVE ANALYSIS, available at SH094 ALI-ABA 755, 757-58 (Apr. 3-5 2003).
26 45 U.S.C. § 185 (2004).
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NATAB decisions are both final and binding on the parties. 27
Federal courts have no authority to determine the merits of a
minor dispute,28 and their authority to review decisions of the
NATAB is distinctly limited.29 However, the courts can enforce
arbitration agreements reached under NATAB processes, just as
they have authority to enforce arbitration agreements or settle-
ment contracts in any other context. But, the federal courts
may also determine whether a specific situation constitutes a
major or minor dispute and, therefore, may determine which
RLA resolution procedure must be followed. °
Federal courts have limited injunctive power in specific minor
dispute situations.3 1 A court may require parties to maintain the
status quo during resolution of a minor dispute, but the party
seeking relief must first demonstrate irreparable injury before
the court will grant the injunction.12 However, the minor dis-
pute must be in arbitration before the NATAB in order for the
court to be able to issue an injunction to maintain the status
quo.33
2. "Major" Disputes
A "major" dispute involves a change in the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement or negotiation of a new collective bar-
gaining agreement.3 4 For example, unilateral changes in wages,
rules, or working conditions are generally major disputes. 5 Re-
negotiation of collective bargaining agreements or negotiation
27 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 373 F.2d 136, 140 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967); see also Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E.
Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 263 (1965) (discussing the Railroad Adjustment Board, the rail
corollary to the NATAB established by 45 U.S.C. § 153).
28 Brown v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 254 F.3d 654, 662-62 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1041 (2001).
29 See Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Soo Line R.R., 266 F.3d 907, 909-10
(8th Cir. 2001); Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 245 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir.
2001).
30 See, e.g., Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
31 See generally Ass'n of Flight Attendants v. Alaska Airlines, 847 F. Supp. 832,
838 (W.D. Wash. 1993).
32 United Transp. Union v. Burlington N. R.R., 458 F.2d 354, 357 (8th Cir.
1972); Int'l Bhd. of Elect. Workers v. Wash. Terminal Co., 473 F.2d 1156, 1171-72
(D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 906 (1973).
33 Westchester Lodge 2186 v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 329 F.2d 748, 753 (2d
Cir. 1964).
34 See, e.g., Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945).
35 See, e.g., id.
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of new agreements are always considered major disputes for pur-
poses of the RLA procedural framework.3 6
The basis of the RLA framework addressing "major" disputes
rests on what have been termed the "status quo" provisions of
the RLA. 7 These provisions prescribe mandatory periods when
workers may not strike and airlines may not substantially change
working conditions. 8 These provisions aim to preserve normal
operations of the airline for a maximized period and may be
triggered by either the company or employees during negotia-
tions or disputes, thus providing time for the parties to reach a
resolution or agreement.
When a "major" dispute arises, the party who seeks to change
the collective bargaining agreement has a duty to give written
notice to the other party of its intent to change the agreement
and what those changes may be. 9 After notice is given, the par-
ties meet to negotiate, in good faith, a resolution of the issue.40
During these negotiations, each side is required to maintain the
status quo in the workplace, which may be for an indefinite pe-
riod due to the unlimited time provided by the RLA for such
negotiations.41 If the parties reach a resolution on their own,
the RLA is no longer needed for guidance in the dispute, but if
negotiations fail, the parties may invoke further procedures.
If a mutual resolution appears impossible to reach, the parties
may request mediation by the National Mediation Board
("NMB"), and the status quo period is extended during the
term of the mediation process.4 2 The airline may request medi-
ation, which would prevent workers from engaging in disruptive
action in an effort to leverage their bargaining position.43 Alter-
natively, the union may request mediation, which would prevent
the company from changing working conditions without the
union's consent.44 Accordingly, either side to a dispute may re-
quest mediation to gain protection of the status quo to prevent
36 Since renegotiation involves changing conditions of the agreement between
the airline and the labor unions, a renegotiation will never be a minor dispute.
By definition, interpreting an existing collective bargaining agreement does not
cover formation of a new agreement. See, e.g., id.
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the other side from taking action to increase their bargaining
leverage, or from taking any action which has not been agreed
to and may lead to a drastic and damaging response by the other
party.45
The mediation phase of the RLA dispute resolution frame-
work can be a protracted event. Mediation can take several
years to conduct, and only when the NMB issues a release stating
that further mediation would be futile are the parties released
from mediation.46 During the entire period, both the airline
and the unionized employees are required to maintain the sta-
tus quo of the workplace, and any variations may be legally ac-
tionable.47 Maintenance of the status quo is required during a
cooling-off period of thirty days after mediation release.48
At the end of the thirty-day period, the President of the
United States has the option of calling a Presidential Emergency
Board to help resolve the dispute, which extends the status quo
requirements for another sixty-day cooling-off period.49 If the
President decides not to call the Presidential Emergency Board,
then the parties may pursue self-help options after the thirty-day
post-mediation period expires.50 Given the extensive conse-
quences to national transportation and commerce implicated in
airline union strikes, it is not unusual for the President to inter-
vene if mediation fails to resolve a union dispute with a major
carrier and reaches this phase. 51 Either party may request this
intervention, however, the President will often decline to inter-
vene if the impact of the anticipated strike is insufficient to war-
rant his involvement.5 2  The federal government will not
intervene unless an airline strike "threaten[s] substantially to in-
terrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any





- Id. § 160.
50 Id. § 156.
51 When a major carrier is involved, the economic impact of a strike can be
great, and political pressures may induce the President to act. See Mike Hughlett,
Bush Could Ignore Pilots Strike, DETROIT FREE PREss, Jan. 9, 2004, available at 2004
WL 56354137.
52 President Bush recently indicated that he would decline to intervene in an
anticipated strike at Mesaba Airlines, a regional carrier servicing ninety cities and
the sole carrier in twenty of those cities. Id.
53 Id.
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Once the post-mediation cooling-off period is over, or the
sixty-day cooling-off period if the President has intervened, the
status quo requirements are lifted. Typically, this results in a
strike or other work stoppage. The economic impact of airline
strikes is not precisely known,54 but the total damages to an air-
line from lost revenues, from the expense of bringing in new
workers and from the damages to workers from lost wages, can
be significant even if the strike is brief. 5 Although mandatory
arbitration requirements or other anti-strike legislation were
proposed even before the enactment of the RLA in 1926, no
such requirements have been imposed on transportation indus-
tries covered by the RLA.56 As a result, unions have preserved
their powerful economic threat of strike to counterbalance em-
ployer power, while inherent instability in the airline industry
arises when carrying out the RLA negotiation and dispute reso-
lution procedures.
C. LEGAL AND ILLEGAL SELF-HELP ACTIONS
The same procedures that the RLA uses to encourage stability
in the airline industry during labor negotiations can frustrate
unions seeking change. When faced with the prospect of having
to wait years to implement change, unions may resort to illegal
job actions to effectuate change in a reasonably timely man-
ner.5 7 These job actions create leverage for the unions at the
risk of temporarily destabilizing the airlines. However, despite
the RLA's attempts to maintain stability, such actions are not
uncommon. Such actions force airlines to seek legal remedies
to restore balance.
Recent examples of union self-help job actions abound. Con-
sider the following examples of commercial disruption, air
freight disruption, and small regional impacts:
54 See id. ("Comprehensive studies of damages from airline strikes don't exist,
according to a 2003 report from the General Accounting Office, the investigatory
arm of Congress.").
55 Damages to a major airline resulting from two days worth of a pilot strike
was determined to amount to more than $45 million. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v.
Allied Pilots Ass'n, 53 F. Supp. 2d 909, 937 (N.D. Tex. 1999), affd, 228 F.3d 574
(5th Cir. 2000).
56 Maureen F. Moore, Hit and Run Strikes-Protected Activity or Suicidal Actions
Under the Railway Labor Act?, 59J. AR L. & COM. 867, 869 (1994)
57 See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 228 F.3d 574, 577 (5th Cir.
2000).
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" In February 1999, American Airlines pilots' union orchestrated
a sick-out that slowed and disrupted operations for over ten
days, costing the airline more than $200 million and "need-
lessly disrupt[ing] the lives of hundreds of thousands of trav-
elers."58 Over 2,500 pilots called in sick to work to protest the
integration of Reno Air pilots into American's seniority lists af-
ter American acquired the small, western regional carrier.5 9
" In the fall of 1997, air freight pilots with Airborne Express re-
fused to bid for unassigned scheduled flights in concerted op-
position to the carrier's interpretation of old and new
collective bargaining agreements. 60 This constituted a self-
help action over a minor dispute and, therefore, was illegal
under the RLA.6
" In January 2004, Mesaba Airlines pilots were scheduled to go
on strike to induce the regional carrier to match the benefits
of other regional carriers.62 Talks had stretched over three
years; the pilots could legally pursue self-help and were poised
to take action.6 The airline canceled one evening's worth of
flights, but in the eleventh hour, the parties reached a
resolution.6 4
In cases where a union or its workers undertake illegal self-
help actions outside of the RLA's procedural framework to han-
dle major disputes, the RIA provides for the airline to pursue
injunctive relief.65 An airline can petition a federal district court
to issue a temporary restraining order against the self-help ac-
tion if the airline can prove that (1) the job action exists, (2)
harm resulted, (3) the job action is illegal under the RLA, and
(4) responsibility lies with the union.66 Only then will a court
issue the restraining order.6 7
58 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 53 F. Supp. 2d 909, 913, 936 (N.D.
Tex. 1999), affd, 228 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2000).
59 Matt Pinckney & David Cooper, Carty's Turbulent Stewardship, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 25, 2003, at A16, available at 2003 WL 17390474.
6 ABX Air, Inc. v. Airline Prof'l Ass'n of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 266 F.3d
392, 394 (6th Cir. 2001).
61 Id. at 398-99.
62 Joshua Freed, Mesaba Strike Suspended: Talks Continue, ABERDEEN AMERICAN
NEWS, Jan. 10, 2004, at Al.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Indirectly, the RLA permits injunctive relief, but this is based on the careful
interplay between the RLA and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See Bhd. of R.R. Train-
men Enter. Lodge, No. 27 v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50, 58-60 (1944).
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Although an illegal strike can cost an airline millions of dol-
lars, the RLA does not provide for damages as a possible rem-
edy.68 Although the RLA does not expressly so provide, an
airline can, however, seek compensatory contempt damages
from the union when the union fails to comply with the court's
injunction.69 These damages are compensatory, not punitive, in
nature, so their amount is limited to the airline's actual losses
resulting from the illegal job action.70 Compensatory contempt
awards have been upheld on appeal, at least in the Fifth Circuit,
in American Airlines v. Allied Pilots Ass'n.7 1 The American Airlines
pilots' union orchestrated a sick-out in February 1999 to protest
the airline's acquisition of Reno Air and its attendant un-
resolved labor issues. 72 American sought and obtained a tempo-
rary restraining order from the federal district court, which the
pilots ignored for two days.73 American petitioned the district
court for compensatory contempt damages to encourage the pi-
lots' union to comply with the court's restraining order, and
those damages were awarded in the amount of over $45.5 mil-
lion. 4 The pilots' union challenged the award on the basis that
the RLA contains no provision for damages arising from illegal
job actions. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the award on the basis
that courts normally have the power to enforce their orders
through compensatory contempt, and this was merely an exer-
cise of that power, which was neither inconsistent with the RLA
nor violated Due Process rights of the union.75
Compensatory contempt damages are rare, however, because
federal restraining orders are usually sufficient to inspire union
compliance. 76 Any strike action implemented before a re-
straining order can be obtained is usually sufficient to increase
the union's bargaining leverage, without causing devastating
damage to the airline.
68 Thomas E. Reinert, Jr., Airline Labor Disruptions: Is the RLA Still Adequate?, 15
AIR & SPACE LAW. 4, 6 (Winter 2001).
69 SeenAm. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 228 F.3d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 2000).
70 See id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 576-77.
73 Id. at 577.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 585-87.
76 Reinert, supra note 68, at 6.
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D. EMPLOYER RESPONSE TO STRIKES: PERMISSIBLE SELF-HELP
AND AVAILABLE REMEDIES
The RLA aims to protect the relationship between an em-
ployer and its organized employees before, during, and after a
dispute. 77 This means that limits exist to the self-help that either
party can seek. Traditionally, in non-transportation industries,
if employees engage in an illegal strike, employers are permitted
to seek their own method of self-help. In situations covered by
the NLRA, these methods could include firing the workers en-
gaging in the illegal job action. Under the RLA, however, air-
lines are generally not permitted to fire employees who engage
in illegal strikes.78 To do so is believed to irreparably strain and
damage the relationship between employers and their employ-
ees in an industry where stability of operations is vital not only to
the company but to the nation. Instead, the employer's only
remedies are to hire replacement workers, as it could under the
NLRA, or seek injunctive relief if it believes that the strike is an
illegal job action or otherwise does not comply with the RLA.' °
If the procedural requirements have not been satisfied, the em-
ployer can obtain a court order either compelling arbitration in
a "minor" dispute, or injunctive relief to enforce the status quo
provisions of the RLA in a "major" dispute.
III. THE CHANGING AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Since the application of the RLA to airline workers' unions in
1936, the airline industry has undergone enormous changes due
not only to technical advances and the maturation of the indus-
try, but also due to government regulation, subsequent de-regu-
lation, increased competitive pressures, and a changing
marketplace. Numerous airlines have reorganized in bank-
ruptcy, some several times, while others have simply folded per-
manently, leaving many of their workers without jobs.
Downward fluctuations in the economy affect the airline indus-
try, as businesses reduce travel spending and recreational trav-
elers decrease their demand for air travel. Efficient airlines
prosper in an economic downturn, while those with higher costs
77 Ass'n of Flight Attendants v. Alaska Airlines, 847 F. Supp. 832, 836 (W.D.
Wash. 1993) ("One of the RLA's central goals [is] the preservation of the em-
ployer-employee relationship both during and after a strike.") (quoting E. Air
Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 920 F.2d 722, 730 (11th Cir. 1990)).
78 See id.
79 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 228 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2000).
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must shave profit margins to be competitive but may become
unprofitable while doing so. Finally, since 9/11 the face of air
travel has completely changed, and airlines have financially
borne many of the newly instituted safety requirements. To re-
main profitable in the modern age of air travel, airlines must
increase their efficiency and decrease their operating costs.
One major way that airlines decrease these costs is cutting labor
costs through lay-offs or reductions in benefits.
The evolution of the airline industry is marked by two notable
events, which functionally separate industry history into three
distinct eras for analysis purposes. The first event marking a
radical change in the airline industry was government deregula-
tion of the airlines in 1978.80 This divides airline history into
pre- and post-deregulation periods. The second major event,
September 11, is much more recent, and its impact may not be
so much a result of the event itself, but a result of the turmoil
the airline industry was thrust into after that day.8' Therefore,
airline history post-deregulation may also be divided into pre-
and post-September 11. Each era will be examined in turn and
the application and subsequent problems of the RLA will be
discussed.
A. IN THE BEGINNING: 1936 THROUGH 1978
During the period when the government regulated almost
every aspect of the airline industry, labor relations under the
RLA had a greater measure of stability than they did after der-
egulation. 82 While questions still existed about certain provi-
sions under the RLA, and there were still the competing
interests of airlines wanting to control costs and labor wanting
to protect wages, benefits, conditions and job security, lower ec-
onomic competitive pressures between airlines reduced the air-
lines' need for optimum efficiency. In fact, airline employees
80 See Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2004).
81 The recession of the economy, in conjunction with dampened demand re-
sulting from passenger fear following the events on September 11, triggered a
severe crisis in the airline industry that required a government bailout to the tune
of $15 billion. See Matt Pinckney & David Cooper, Carty's Turbulent Stewardship,
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 25, 2003, at A16, available at 2003 WL
17390474.
82 See Laurie Schoder, Note, Flying the Unfriendly Skies: The Effect of Airline Deregu-
lation on Labor Relations, 22 TRANsP. L.J. 105, 106-07 (1994) (blaming deregulation
for reversal of a trend of improving salaries, working conditions and benefits for
air employees and crediting deregulation for the loss of hundreds of thousands
of aviation jobs).
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benefited from stable and increasing wages, secure employment
and good working conditions.8" In short, all was relatively quiet
on the home front-at least until the end of government
regulation.
B. PosT-DEREGULATION: 1978 THROUGH 2001
Increased competitive pressures following deregulation
ushered in dramatic changes in airline operations and employ-
ment. When the airline industry was deregulated, many new air-
lines formed, thereby increasing competition between airlines.
In efforts to reduce operating costs, workforces were trimmed
and, as a result, unemployment in the aviation industry in-
creased. 84 As time passed and the airline market grew increas-
ingly competitive, mergers and bankruptcies became fairly
commonplace in the industry, introducing new problems for
labor. 85
Each airline has unions representing its employees, and those
unions operate primarily on the basis of seniority. Seniority gov-
erns an employee's position as it relates to company pay scale,
benefits, entitlements, and other aspects of an employee's work-
ing conditions. However, when an airline merges or folds due
to bankruptcy, the seniority of its workers is often lost when they
seek employment elsewhere.86 When an airline reorganizes in
bankruptcy, it commonly disavows existing labor contracts and
subjects workers to its unilateral demands to permit the airline
to survive, all of which is condoned by a bankruptcy court.87
1. Mergers
Airline mergers disrupt the seniority system of the acquiring
airline by forcing integration of a new set of workers, often at
the expense of the acquired employees. Historically, adminis-
trative entities such as the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") over-
saw airline mergers and attempted to ensure fair treatment of




86 Id. at 123.
87 See id. at 119-21.
88 See id. at 114-15 (discussing the role of the CAB and its use of Labor Protec-
tion Provisions to ensure equitable treatment of employees). In 1984, the CAB's
authority to monitor mergers was transferred to the Department of Transporta-
tion, which never applied Labor Protection Provisions. Id. at 115. Five years later,
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line industry are subject to the exclusive scrutiny of the Depart-
ment of Justice, which will only challenge a merger on the basis
of antitrust issues, but not on the basis of employee interests.8 9
This leaves employees to fend for themselves in merger situa-
tions, which often leaves them at the mercy of their new em-
ployer with little incoming protection.
As previously discussed, the National Mediation Board
("NMB") must recognize a labor union in order for the union to
negotiate with an airline under the terms of the RLA. ° The
RLA itself requires that a bargaining representative represent
one craft or class of worker, and the craft/class may not have
multiple bargaining representatives.91 When airlines merge,
however, the bargaining representative for either the acquiring
or acquired group of employees often changes. This occurs be-
cause the NMB mandates that upon the effective merger date,
any union that represents employees of the acquired airline is
"decertified" and is no longer recognized as the representative
for that particular group of employees.12 This terminates the
"permanent" collective bargaining agreement established origi-
nally by the now-decertified union, and the labor forces of the
merging airlines must attempt to integrate.
Merging the workforces of two airlines strains labor relations
within the group itself. The workers must decide which group
will represent the newly-commingled employees in order to have
a bargaining unit certified by the NMB that is authorized to ne-
gotiate with the merged airline. Competition and dispute over
who should represent the new group can lead to strained rela-
tionships and bitter fights between old and new workers in the
company." However, without a certified bargaining group, the
in 1989, the Department of Transportation lost authority to rule on airline merg-
ers, and that responsibility went to the Department of Justice. Id. at 115-16.
89 Id. at 116.
90 See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2004).
91 Id.
92 Jonni Walls, Airline Mergers, Acquisitions and Bankruptcies: Will the Collective
Bargaining Agreement Survive?, 56J. AIR. L. & COM. 847, 861 (1991).
93 See D.R. Stewart, Mechanic Unions Set Debates, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 8, 2004, at
El, available at 2004 WL 61451038. Although the mechanics that Stewart dis-
cusses in his article are not being forced to choose which union will represent
them as a result of a merger and the resulting influx of new employees, the level
of competition and obvious stress between these two dueling unions vying for
representation is common. In cases where new employees are forced to relin-
quish their former bargaining representative and then attempt to elect new rep-
resentation (if it is not forced upon them) to protect their interests while
integrating into an existing workforce, the level of competition and animosity will
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acquired employees cannot make any progress in negotiating la-
bor terms with management.
Even when a certified bargaining group is in place, incoming
workers may feel slighted by their integration into the existing
group. For example, in 2001, American Airlines ("American")
acquired the assets of Trans-World Airlines ("TWA") in bank-
ruptcy proceedings.94 This acquisition gave American, among
other things, 1,778 flight attendants who were former TWA em-
ployees.95 Both American and former-TWA flight attendants
were represented by the Association of Professional Flight At-
tendants ("APFA"), which reached an "Agreement on Seniority
Integration" with American prior to the end of 2001.96 As part
of this agreement, the former TWA flight attendants were
moved to the bottom of the American seniority system.97 In
March 2003, American sought cost-saving concessions from the
APFA in the form of 2,550 "furloughed" flight attendants in or-
der to avoid bankruptcy. 98 Since furloughs were decided on the
basis of seniority, with American furloughing the most junior
employees first, all of the former TWA flight attendants were cut
from American's ranks.9 9 Legal action followed, and the senior-
ity system and the subsequent furlough decision were upheld,
but the distress the former TWA flight attendants felt was
clear.100
Though it is unfortunate that employees acquired by the
merger of two airlines are often placed at the bottom of the se-
niority scale regardless of their experience, the airlines have pre-
vious responsibilities to their established employees in those
logically be greater than where a single workforce is choosing new representa-
tion. The competing interests of new and old employees in a merger situation
increase the personal and emotional involvement of all workers in the "craft or
class" and can create potentially volatile situations.
94 Cooper v. TWA Airlines, L.L.C., 274 F. Supp. 2d 231, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
95 Id. at 238.
96 Id. at 236.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 237.
99 Id. at 238.
loo Id. at 251. It is particularly interesting to note that American flight attend-
ants referred to the former TWA flight attendants as a "furlough cushion," mean-
ing that existing employees had more job security as a result of relegating the
incoming TWA employees to the bottom of the seniority system. Id. at 244. This
was not relevant to the court's findings in Cooper but is another indication that
acquired employees can be viewed as having inferior rights and benefits when
entering an already unionized workplace and that perhaps they need to be af-
forded more protection.
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situations. The airline has collective bargaining agreements in
place with their existing employees through the unions, and
both parties must agree to changes to those agreements in order
to avoid the time-consuming RLA dispute resolution proce-
dures. No airline would want, or could afford, to spend several
years in negotiation with its labor unions before completing a
merger when material situation changes may occur in that time
that may make the merger no longer feasible. The result is that
the incoming workers have little bargaining leverage to avoid
being placed at the low end of the seniority totem pole, and the
acquiring airline has little incentive to upset the unions that re-
present existing employees, who likely outnumber the incoming
workers.
2. Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy, like merger, is an event that can shake up an air-
line's labor unions and their collective bargaining agreements.
Bankruptcy for an airline can take two forms: liquidation under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or restructuring under Chap-
ter 11. Liquidation is rare and usually results in an asset sale,
which, for the purposes of labor unions, usually operates much
like a merger. Chapter 11 restructuring, however, presents new
and different situations that can test the relationship between an
airline and its labor unions as an airline tries to modify its con-
tracts, agreements and obligations with all creditors in order to
survive.
The effects of liquidation are similar to those of a merger.
The loss of seniority, the secondary treatment of incoming work-
ers, and the airline's obligation to honor its pre-existing union
agreements without regard for the impact it will have on the
incoming workers are the same for a liquidation as for a merger.
In fact, the example previously discussed from Cooper v. TWA
Airlines"1 is a case where liquidation from bankruptcy resulted
in the merging of two workforces when American Airlines ac-
quired TWA's assets.
Situations where an airline reorganizes under bankruptcy pro-
tection operate quite differently than merger situations. When
a company seeks bankruptcy protection to reorganize, it gains
the power to renegotiate obligations with its creditors.1 0 2 While
101 Id. at 236.
102 Though a bankruptcy debtor does not explicitly have the right to demand
contract modification in most cases, as a practical matter creditors will renegoti-
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an airline's creditors frequently include commercial lenders,
employees are also creditors whose contract rights can be al-
tered through bankruptcy proceedings. The goal of any reor-
ganization is to provide enough financial relief to stabilize an air
carrier, permit it to survive, and if the reorganization is success-
ful, profit in the future. The question then becomes, how much
should organized employees be required to sacrifice to achieve
this relief?
Section 1167 of the Bankruptcy Code does not permit auto-
matic rejection of collective bargaining agreements subject to
the RLA without going through the RLA's procedural frame-
work. However, adherence to this requirement could mean that
negotiations to modify the contracts could extend so long that
the chances for the airline's survival dwindle to impractical. In
the alternative, an airline could simply reject its existing con-
tracts. In 1984, Congress addressed this dilemma by enacting
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code to provide some protec-
tion to unionized employees without forcing an airline to go
through the protracted RLA resolution procedures. 11 3 The air-
line is still required to bargain in good faith with its labor unions
before modifying or terminating a collective bargaining agree-
ment, and the unions are required to have good cause for re-
jecting any proposed change to the collective bargaining
agreement or otherwise risk termination of the entire agree-
ment.1 0 4 Section 1113 expedites the entire negotiation and res-
olution process, and permits bankruptcy courts greater
flexibility to help an airline reorganize and resume business on
its own.
Despite the practical changes the Bankruptcy Code has made
to the RLA dispute resolution process, bankruptcy is still a situa-
tion that the labor unions would like to avoid at great cost. For
example, in April 2003 the board of American's parent corpora-
tion authorized bankruptcy filing after losing $1.04 billion in
the first three months of the year and a labor relations crisis that
ate obligations with the debtor and the bankruptcy trustee in order to avoid forc-
ing the company to liquidate and shut down - a situation that can leave the
creditors in a worse financial position than renegotiation. Instead, the creditors
will file their claims against the bankruptcy estate in order to be included in the
company's reorganization plan. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2004).
103 Laurie Schoder, Note, Flying the Unfriendly Skies: The Effect of Airline Deregula-
tion on Labor Relations, 22 TRANSP. LJ. 105, 120 (1994).
104 See In reAm. Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 910 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) id. at
119-21 (1994).
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looked like it would foil any hope for passing needed conces-
sions to keep the airline out of bankruptcy." 5 The airline had
been on the edge of bankruptcy since February 2002, and only
the unions' agreement to $1.6 billion in concessions kept the
airline solvent.1"6 These concessions were undoubtedly more at-
tractive to the labor unions than the possible aftermath of the
airline declaring bankruptcy.
C. INDUSTRY-WIDE FINANCIAL CRUNCH: POST-
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
On September 11, 2001, the American air travel industry was
brought to a screeching halt when all commercial and other
non-military planes were grounded.1 0 7 Airports were shut down
and flights were cancelled as the country sought to stabilize itself
after terrorists employed commercial airplanes as ad-hoc bombs
to attack the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pen-
tagon in Washington, D.C.108 Anyone who has traveled by air
since September 11 has seen changes in security measures, ac-
companying the implementation of a national Travel Security
Administration. Baggage and passenger screening measures
were increased, and airlines were forced to help cover the costs
of the increased security measures.
One of the most serious consequences of September 11 for
the airline industry was the resulting decline in air travel. This
decline in demand stemmed from fear of repeat acts of terror-
ism and coincided with a general economic decline. Together,
these two events created a new climate for commercial airlines
one in which they were not competing for profits, but for
survival.
In the days immediately following September 11, the airline
industry was in chaos. Lost revenues from the multiple days that
airlines were prohibited from operating in United States air-
space sent the industry into a tailspin that threatened the sol-
vency of major United States' airlines. On September 22, 2001,
President Bush signed an emergency aid package, immediately
105 Trebor Banstetter, Carty Resigns: American Remains on Brink of Bankruptcy as
Flight Attendants Balk at Revised Concessions, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 25,
2003, at Al, available at 2003 WL 17390489.
106 Matt Pinckney & David Cooper, Carty's Turbulent Stewardship, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 25, 2003, at A16, available at 2003 WL 17390474.
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allocating $15 billion to keep the nation's air carriers flying.1"9
Following the reopening of financial markets after September
11, many airlines found themselves the target of massive stock
sell-offs. 110 Carriers that were profitable the year before were
posting financial losses in the billions of dollars.111 Many air-
lines, including many of the major ones, have declared bank-
ruptcy since September 11.112 Some have reorganized, some
have disappeared, and all of them are facing a new
threat-increased competition from low-cost, "no frills" airlines.
Southwest Airlines first made the "no-frills" airline approach
both successful and profitable, but select regional carriers and
some major-airline wannabes, like Jet Blue, have now adopted
the approach. The idea is simple: take several hours worth of air
travel, eliminate the notoriously questionable airline food,
streamline operations wherever you can, and price your fares
below the other major airlines. For Southwest, "streamlining
operations" meant having a fleet of identical planes (Boeing
737s) to ease maintenance, eliminating assigned seating because
it increases an airplane's gate time, serving drinks and peanuts
instead of meals, and abandoning the hub-and-spoke model
most airlines employ in favor of direct routes to most destina-
tions. '1 3 As a result, Southwest has been the only consistently
profitable airline since September 11 and is a major threat to
the ailing major U.S. air carriers.' 14
With the current economic recession, consumer and business
demand for air travel has declined. 11 5 Travel is a luxury expen-
diture for most people and is quickly sacrificed during eco-
nomic downturns. This leaves the major airlines especially
109 Matt Pinckney & David Cooper, Carty's Turbulent Stewardship, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 25, 2003, at A16, available at 2003 WL 17390474.
110 Id.
11 American Airlines, the largest U.S. air carrier, had posted profits of $1.9
billion for 1998, $985 million for 1999, and $813 million for 2000. Id. In 2001,
American posted losses of $1.7 billion. Id. The situation did not improve in
2002, as the airline went on to post further losses of $3.5 billion, "cit[ing] rising
costs, slack demand, aftereffects of the terrorist attacks and competition from
discount rivals." Id.
112 See Andy Serwer, Southwest Airlines: The Hottest Thing in the Sky, FORTUNE,
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vulnerable to no-frills airlines that can offer lower fares because
of lower operating costs. In turn, this increases financial pres-
sure on other airlines, pushing them closer to insolvency. Many
carriers look to concessions from labor to keep them afloat
while they struggle to catch up with the lower-cost carriers. 116
Labor unions are forced to agree to such concessions, or face
bankruptcy reorganization or complete unemployment.
Many questions regarding the future of airline labor relations
remain to be answered. When the economy rebounds and de-
mand for air travel increases, how quickly will airlines repay the
union concessions that enabled their survival? How long and
how much profit will it take for American to repay workers the
$1.6 billion in concessions that kept the company out of bank-
ruptcy? It remains to be seen if current streamlining efforts will
continue when the economy improves, or if traditional airlines
will tolerate lingering inefficiencies and arguably unnecessary
"frills" at the expense of their labor unions.
IV. INTERMITTENT STRIKES: LEGAL OR ILLEGAL?
AND WHAT DO THEY MEAN
PROTECTED/UNPROTECTED?
The most powerful aspect of the RLA is that while it is de-
signed to prevent strikes in the airline industry, it still permits
them to occur. Though the term "strike" is not found in the
statute itself, the RLA implicitly protects airline workers' right to
strike once they satisfy the procedural safeguards of the negotia-
tion and resolution processes. In cases of minor disputes, where
striking is always illegal, or major disputes that have not followed
RLA Section 6 procedures, intermittent strikes are treated just
like regular strikes - illegal and subject to injunction." 7
A notably gray area of permissible airline union strike tactics
are "intermittent" strikes under the RIA. For example, in 1993
Alaska Airlines flight attendants instituted a "Create Havoc
Around Our System" ("CHAOS") program, where flight attend-
ants on specific flights would announce an hour before their
flight departure that they intended to strike.118 The flight at-
116 Trebor Bansetter, Carty Resigns: American Remains on Brink of Bankruptcy as
Flight Attendants Balk at Revised Concessions, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 25,
2003, at Al, available at 2003 WL 17390489.
117 See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 228 F.3d 574, 577 (5th Cir.
2000).
118 Ass'n of Flight Attendants v. Alaska Airlines, 847 F. Supp. 832, 833 (W.D.
Wash. 1993).
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tendants would then express their willingness, before the flights
would leave, to return to work on their scheduled, or any other,
flights.' 9 In each instance where this tactic was employed,
Alaska Airlines declined the workers' offer to return to ser-
vice. 120 Twenty-four striking flight attendants affected a total of
seven flights over a one-month period.' 2' Of those flights, six
were staffed by other Alaska Airlines employees and one was
canceled. 22
The Association of Flight Attendants ("AFA"), who had organ-
ized the CHAOS campaign after contract negotiations
progressed through the RLA dispute resolution framework and
failed, sought an injunction to prevent Alaska Airlines from dis-
missing the CHAOS campaign participants in the future, and
sought reinstatement with back pay and benefits to the flight
attendants who were disciplined for their participation in the
CHAOS program. 123 The court granted the injunction to pre-
vent Alaska Airlines from firing future CHAOS participants and
required reinstatement of the discharged and indefinitely sus-
pended flight attendants. 124 However, Alaska Airlines could per-
manently replace striking employees if the replacements
performed services as flight attendants prior to the striking
flight attendants' offer to return to work.' 25 Alaska Airlines
would then have to reinstate the replaced flight attendant when
positions became available that were not CHAOS-created.
26
In assessing the flight attendants' request for an injunction,
the court in Association of Flight Attendants v. Alaska Airlines was
careful to note that although the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") disfavors intermittent work stoppages, the only other
court to address intermittent work stoppages in the RLA context
declined to import the NLRA viewpoint. 27 The Second Circuit,
in Pan Am World Airways, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters,128 did not decide whether an intermittent strike, such as





123 Id. at 834.
124 Id. at 838.
125 Id,
126 Id. at 835.
127 Id.
128 Pan Am. World Ainvays, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 894 F.2d. 36, 40 (2d Cir.
1990).
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fore subject to employer retaliation. 12 At issue in Pan Am was
whether intermittent strike tactics were legal at all. 13' The court
held that intermittent strikes that take place during the self-help
phase of the RLA resolution framework are legal and therefore
not subject to injunctive relief.1 3 ' Under the NLRA, intermit-
tent strikes are perfectly legal and not subject to injunctive re-
lief, but they are considered "unprotected activities," leaving
employers free to discharge or otherwise discipline strikers with-
out fear of injunction. 13 2
"Partial strikes," often categorized with intermittent strikes be-
cause of their similar treatment under the NLRA, have rarely
been legally used in the RLA context. A partial strike can take
the form of a sick-out, slow-down, or work-to-the-rule concerted
action, which is less than a full strike by labor unions. In the
case of the American Airlines pilots' sick-out discussed earlier,13
the district court was free to grant injunctive relief to American
Airlines and force their pilots back to work because the parties
had not yet progressed to the self-help phase of the RLA frame-
work, making the job action illegal.3 Use of partial strikes in
the context of a minor disputes is likewise illegal. 3 5 A court has
yet to rule on the legality of partial strikes per se during the sanc-
tioned self-help period provided by the RLA resolution frame-
work. If NLRA principles are imported in this area of RLA
interpretation despite Alaska Airlines, the use of partial strikes
would be legal but disfavored. 136 This interpretation would enti-
tie employers to retaliate and employ self-help methods such as
permanently replacing or discharging employees who partici-




132 Samuel Estreicher & Robert Siegel, Partial Strikes Under the Railway Labor Act:
The Need for a Doctrine of Unprotected Concerted Activity, 18 LAB. LAw. 15, 20 (2002).
133 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. See generally Am. Airlines, Inc.
v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 228 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2000).
134 Am. Airlines, Inc., 228 F.3d at 577 n.6 (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied
Pilots Ass'n, 53 F. Supp. 2d 909, 917 (N.D. Tex. 1999)).
135 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, 847 F. Supp. at 836.
136 See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd of Teamsters, 894 F.2d 36, 40
(2d Cir. 1990) ("In any event, intermittent work stoppages are not unfair labor
practices under the NLRA. Rather, some repeated, intermittent work stoppages
are merely 'unprotected' activity that may legally be the cause of discharge or
discipline by the employer.") (internal citations omitted).
137 Estreicher & Siegel, supra note 132, at 20.
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It is clear that partial or intermittent strikes may be legal13
and are not subject to injunctive relief, but it is not clear
whether, and to what extent, an employer may respond to such
strikes, Alaska Airlines notwithstanding."3 9 If Alaska Airlines is the
trend that the law will follow, airlines will have little in their arse-
nal with which to defend themselves against a powerful labor
union weapon. Requiring airlines to reinstate previously sus-
pended workers amounts to a mere slap on the wrist for union
members.1 ,0
V. STATUTORY REVISIONS NEEDED
The most glaring need for statutory revisions come from (1)
the increase in airline mergers, which disrupt seniority systems
for workers, and (2) the open question about the legality of in-
termittent, CHAOS-like strikes, which can disrupt the transpor-
tation industry over minor disputes. These issues represent ways
that the airline industry has changed while the statutory scheme
covering airline labor relations has not evolved to accommodate
these changes, and each will be addressed in turn.
Notably, Congress has already addressed, at least in part, the
inadequacies of the RLA as it deals with labor agreements be-
tween unions and airlines undergoing reorganization. As previ-
ously discussed, Congress modified the Bankruptcy Code to
provide airline employees protection during Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy proceedings, which have the potential to disrupt estab-
lished collective bargaining agreements without following RLA
procedures. 4' An airline's bankruptcy petition is no longer
carte blanche to un-unionize, but rather a license to modify col-
lective bargaining agreements as needed to allow survival.' 42
138 See Alaska Airlines, 847 F. Supp. at 838; Pan Am World Airways, 894 F. Supp. at
40.
139 Alaska Airlines is the only case that addresses whether an intermittent strike
is a protected or unprotected activity for purposes of determining permissible
employer response. It was never appealed, and all other cases dealing with par-
tial or intermittent strikes have been evaluated for their legality, not their protec-
tion status.
140 See Alaska Airlines, 847 F. Supp. at 837.
141 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. Section 1113 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1113, was enacted in 1984 in response to unilateral
abrogation of union agreements, drastic wage and benefit reductions, and senior-
ity elimination by Continental Airlines in its 1983 venture into Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy. Jonni Walls, Airline Mergers, Acquisitions and Bankruptcies: Will the Collective
Bargaining Agreement Survive?, 56 J. AIR. L. & COM. 847, 883 (1991).
142 See 11 U.S.C. § l113(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2004).
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The addition of Section 1113 to the Bankruptcy Code provides a
swifter mechanism for collective bargaining between labor un-
ions and troubled airlines, but no longer permits outright rejec-
tion of existing labor agreements. 143
A. INTEGRATING LABOR FORCES
Gone are the days when airline employment meant a solid,
life-long career with one company. Mergers, layoffs and bank-
ruptcies can force workers to essentially restart their careers with
a new employer, entering at the bottom rung of the ladder.
New employees at an airline, regardless of their prior experi-
ence, are placed at the bottom of the seniority system in most
cases. 144 This leaves them under-compensated for their level of
experience, but they can do little about it. They are represented
by a union that has likely agreed to this arrangement in order to
keep the remainder of its membership satisfied.
Currently, acquiring airlines often have to honor the employ-
ment contracts that they have made with their own unions or
face breach of contract claims brought by labor. In many cases,
the terms of the merger or the acquisition do not create any
incentive for airlines or their existing labor unions to provide
any protection for incoming workers. As a result, incoming
workers are relegated to the bottom of the seniority totem pole
despite having extensive experience and seniority with the ac-
quired airline. Facing contract actions, the airlines are content
to ignore the seniority of acquired employees, and as a result,
they may employ many undervalued employees-ones making
far less in salary or benefits than to which they are entitled by
virtue of their experience.
The labor unions representing existing workers at an acquir-
ing airline have little incentive to provide any protection to in-
coming workers. Generally, the number of incoming workers is
far less than the number of existing workers, so a majority of the
union's resulting membership has no desire to protect the in-
coming workers. The incoming workers are thus relegated to
the status of "furlough cushion" in many cases. 145 Incoming
343 Id. § 1113(c)(2). For an extended discussion of Section 1113 and its expe-
dited collective bargaining process, see Schoder, supra note 103, at 119-21.
144 See Cooper v. TWA Airlines, L.L.C., 274 F. Supp. 2d 231, 244 (E.D.N.Y.
2003).
145 Id. Incoming workers immediately placed at the bottom of the seniority
system provide security for existing workers by artificially boosting their position
in the seniority system. As a result, workers with less experience have more job
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workers are underrepresented in the collective bargaining pro-
cess by virtue of the decertification of their bargaining represen-
tative upon the date of merger or acquisition, and are thus at an
unfair disadvantage. 146
With the increase in mergers and bankruptcy acquisitions in
the airline industry, incoming workers need job protection and
some assurance that they will not be effectively demoted to en-
try-level status merely because their airline merged with another
or was acquired through bankruptcy liquidation. But problems
with merging seniority systems in a fair manner can place labor
unions and airlines in awkward positions. If required to negoti-
ate a fair seniority integration plan, unions could be seen as dis-
loyal to their existing membership as a result of their efforts to
secure job protections for workers who are not yet in their
ranks. Airlines could find themselves the target ofjob actions or
could trigger hostile relations with their labor unions if they at-
tempt to force the union to integrate new union members at
different ranks on the seniority scale. In fact, requiring airlines
to merge the new employees into the seniority system in a fair
manner may provoke the unions to attempt to block the acquisi-
tion or merger, or otherwise take action that may not be in the
best interest of the airline as a whole.
Requiring a straight integration of the new seniority system
into the existing seniority system as a matter of law is not as sim-
ple a proposition as it appears. The structure of airline seniority
systems can vary significantly from airline to airline. For exam-
ple, Delta Airlines has, in the past, used a two-tier seniority sys-
tem, while Southwest Airlines' seniority system is single-tier but
provides for employee-ownership options.1 4 7 There is no simple
way to integrate two divergent systems, and it would require ne-
gotiation between the acquiring airline and the labor union rep-
resenting its existing employees. The labor union representing
the incoming employees would be excluded because it will be
decertified by the time any agreement becomes effective. This
places the process back at square one; the airlines would have
protection, higher wages and better benefits than workers who may have substan-
tially longer experience in their craft. Yet, these more experienced incoming
workers will be the first laid off or furloughed when the need arises in the senior-
ity system's Last In, First Out mechanism of operation.
146 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
147 See Beth S. Adler, Comment, Deregulation in the Airline Industry: Toward a New
Judicial Interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1003, n.213 (1986);
see also Schoder, supra note 103, at 114.
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no incentive to protect the incoming workers at the risk of up-
setting existing labor relations, and the labor union would have
no incentive to offer protections to employees it does not yet
represent and who are likely a minority of its membership.
The problem of integrating seniority systems may seem daunt-
ing, but a simple way to protect incoming employees is to revive
the Labor Protection Provisions ("LPPs") originally used by the
Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB").148 Acquiring airlines face con-
tract limitations on the benefits that they may extend to ac-
quired employees depending on existing agreements that they
may have with their labor unions. Providing an administrative
entity that governs these relationships would take obligations of
this nature outside of the realm of contract law and place it
squarely in the hands of a neutral administrative body.
The LPPs that the CAB applied to merging airlines effectively
protected acquired workers. The LPPs covered everything from
seniority integration to moving expenses and supplemental pay
for workers whose new jobs paid less than their old ones.149 No
employees of the acquired company or acquiring airline would
receive less than what they were entitled to under their existing
labor contracts.1 50
After deregulation, the CAB lost all authority to rule on air-
line mergers, and LPPs, although theoretically available for a
time after merger authority was transferred, have never been im-
posed.15 1 Currently, the Department of Justice is the only ad-
ministrative agency with authority to block airline mergers, but
they have no authority to do so on the grounds of labor unfair-
ness; the DOJ's only avenue to block a merger is to seek an in-
junction on antitrust grounds.152
The NLRA has the National Labor Relations Board as its in-
terpretive administrative agency, and as mergers and cases in-
volving employees acquired en masse from airlines increase, the
RLA needs a statutory administrative agency to oversee mergers
and acquisitions to ensure fairness. 51 Application of the LPPs is
a solution that not only makes sense, but would represent a re-
148 See Shoder, supra note 103, at 114.
,49 See id. at 114-15 (discussing the role of the CAB and its use of LPPs to en-




153 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2004).
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turn to stability for workers in the airline industry who may no
longer be able to spend their entire careers with one airline.
B. LIMITING CHAOS
While the right to strike is a potent weapon in a labor union's
arsenal, it has long been recognized that rules must regulate
when that weapon may be used. The RLA seeks to restrict use of
the strike weapon to situations where the parties have exhausted
all other resolution procedures. Other labor legislation, like the
NLRA, recognizes that there are times when strike use is "pro-
tected" and other times when it is "not protected.' 1 54 Intermit-
tent strikes, however, differ from general strikes greatly in their
impact on operations and the level of chaos they create for an
employer.
Consider the Alaska Airlines CHAOS episode discussed ear-
lier. 5 The employer was faced with the possibility that a select
few employees could strike, with little or no notice, for a short
time. How does an employer prepare for such an event? What
if the delivered strike is more severe than the anticipated strike?
The airline is effectively at the mercy of the employees, if only
for a short period of time. As seen from the American Airlines
pilot sick-out in 1999, which cost the airline hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in the span of a few days, damages from these
tactics can be severe.' 56 As seen from Alaska Airlines, airlines can
do little to combat the use of these techniques other than tem-
porarily replace employees, as the airline is required to reinstate
them when a job opening arises. 157
For labor unions, the partial strike tool is particularly appeal-
ing because while it causes airline operation disruption and in-
creases the union's bargaining leverage, partial strikes permit
workers to still collect paychecks and receive benefits, whereas
general strikes do not. If courts follow the Alaska Airlines ruling,
the risks to striking workers are slight, making the probability of
intermittent strikes greater than the probability of a general
strike.
Nothing special about intermittent strikes warrants different
treatment than cases arising under the NLRA's non-transporta-
154 Ass'n of Flight Attendants v. Alaska Airlines, 847 F. Supp. 832, 835 (W.D.
Wash. 1993).
155 See supra notes 118-126 and accompanying text.
156 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 228 F.3d 574, 577 (5th Cir.
2000).
157 See Ass'n of Flight Attendants, 847 F. Supp. at 838.
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tion context. They are not a device that promotes stability in
the airline industry, and therefore should not be excepted from
standard application of NLRA principles to RLA cases. Rather,
in the context of airline operations, CHAOS-like strikes can be
more severe than in other contexts. Airlines run on a set time
schedule, and missed flights mean missed revenues, delayed
travel, delayed freight transport and other disruptions to inter-
state commerce. In Alaska Airlines, the partial strike included
only a handful of striking workers at a given time, and the air-
line was able to find replacements for the striking flight attend-
ants. 158 But what if it had been more than a few workers at a
time? What if the strikes had been more frequent? Placing an
airline in the position of potentially facing a partial strike by a
much larger number of its flight attendants and permitting the
strikes to recur at random intervals places the industry in a dicey
position. Eventually, as workers continually offered to return to
service before their flights, the airline would take for granted
the offer to return and would force flight attendants to follow
through with their threats to disrupt flight service. But what
could the airline do in response? Alaska Airlines suggests they
should "permanently replace" the striking flight attendants.1 59
And then they must reinstate them. 6 °
Airlines should be permitted to discharge CHAOS-style strik-
ing workers for the sake of operations stability, if not to accord
with NLRA principles. Permitting airlines to discharge workers
in CHAOS situations would turn the intermittent strike tool into
a kamikaze option for labor unions and would likely drastically
reduce, if not completely eliminate, use of such tactics.
The text of the RLA currently does not contain the word
"strike," but perhaps it should. Congress should amend the stat-
ute to specifically reflect that certain activities are "protected"
and "unprotected" in the parlance of the NLRA.16 1 Specifically
identifying partial or intermittent strikes occurring in otherwise
valid self-help periods as "unprotected" activity would force
courts to accept that airlines should be able to respond to such
tactics by discharging striking employees. This would explicitly
overrule Alaska Airlines and drastically decrease the desirability
of the partial strike tool for unions.
158 Id. at 833.
159 See id. at 837-38.
160 Id.
161 See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (setting forth "unfair labor practices" which provides
the zones of protected and unprotected activity).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the post-deregulation age where airlines face an increas-
ingly competitive marketplace and economic stress, the RLA is
no longer adequate to ensure protection for airline employees.
Workers can no longer expect to spend their entire careers with
one airline, and provisions must exist to provide protection for
workers when their employer has been liquidated or merged
with another airline. The most practical solution to the prob-
lem is to reinstitute the LPPs previously applied to such situa-
tions, and to establish a separate administrative agency to
govern airline mergers. In order to effectuate this change, how-
ever, Congress must act. Congress needs to authorize the estab-
lishment of such an entity and vest it with the power to apply
LPPs in cases where workers' rights, benefits and status are in
jeopardy as a result of merger or acquisition.
As competitive pressures increase, Congress must also act to
curtail the ability of labor unions to engage in partial or inter-
mittent strikes against airlines. Permitting partial or intermit-
tent strikes, without permitting airlines to discharge workers
engaging in them, disrupts the balance of power between labor
unions and the airlines. This shift in the balance of power in-
creases the likelihood that labor unions will disrupt airline oper-
ations with little notice, dramatically affecting interstate
commerce. The judiciary has not adequately recognized and
dealt with this problem, so Congress should act preemptively to
return to airlines the ability to combat these intermittent strike
techniques. Permitting airline employers to discharge striking
workers would decrease, if not eliminate, the use of intermittent
or partial strike tactics and restore stability to the industry.
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